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I 
Any argument concerning self-images, roles and conceptions of 
intellectuals must first try to define its own highly problematic central 
concept. 'The intellectual', whether expressed in the singular or in the plural, 
designates neither a social class nor a class of profession. It is rather a 
thoroughly "discursive phenomenon", that "must be reconstructed from the 
elements of discourse about intellectuals" in each particular historical 
situation.' What an intellectual is is revealed in each act of positive or 
negative attribution of a 'mission' or 'designation'. Such attributions of 
course usually carry with them a social role, which can be accepted or rejected. 
Nonetheless, the social situation in which 'the intellectuals' exist remains 
diffuse. Distributed over a large number of professional categories, they 
belong to the "socially free-floating intelligentsia" (according to Alfred 
Weber's characterization, which Karl Mannheim then reproduced in a more 
differentiated way), to a "relatively class-free section of the population that is 
not very firmly fixed in social space." This remarkable state of suspension 
sensitizes them socially and creates a "homogeneous medium" for a plurality 
of voices and for dynamic contradiction in discursive debate. At the same 
time the state of suspension encourages distance, that much-referred-to 
intellectual "doubt", as the correspondent of social "fragmentati~n."~ 
It is meaningful to connect these general socio-epistemological ([wissens- 
]soziologischen) remarks with a few historically concrete thoughts on the 
problem of the nature of intellectuals. The discursively generated figure of 
the modem intellectual as the spokesperson for universal values, as the 
'conscience' (alternatively of nation, class democracy, humanity, etc.), as the 
guardian of "the definitive values of opinions and beliefs",'" responsible for 
the symbolic order of things, appears not by chance at the same time as the 
decline of religiosity in Western modernity, and against a background of 
pervasive disillusionment, rationalization and secularization. Modem 
intellectuals, generally freed from immediate and unavoidable conditions of 
work and life, and equipped with the privilege of generally unimpeded 
contemplation that crosses existing boundaries, are simultaneously subject to 
the danger of having to appreciate and think through the global condition of 
modem civilization in its unadulterated unredeemability (Heil-losigkeit.) 
The intellectual as an outgrowth of the modernizing process par excellence 
experiences first and most consciously the pathology of modernity as the 
removal of meaning and hope of Redemption. The human psyche is not 
equipped to withstand this experience unmediatedly. The intellectual 
therefore, in the words of Max Weber, "tries to give a consistent 'meaning' to 
his life by way of endless specious ethical rationalizations, looking to create 
'unity' with himself, others and the cosmos."" As the constitutional searcher 
for meaning who succeeds the priest, he endeavors to compensate for this 
experience of withdrawal and becomes the founder of meaning and the 
teacher of the doctrine of Redemption in cold, desolate, God-forsaken places, 
who in extreme cases claims "to control the Redemption of all reality.""' Very 
different philosophers, sociologists of knowledge and historians from Karl 
Mannheim and Karl Lowith to Jean-Franqois Lyotard and Franqois Furet 
have described these far-reaching processes both sympathetically and 
critically. Mannheim was the first to show in "Ideologie und Utopie" (1929) 
how in socialist-communist utopia the old chiliastic expectation of the 
Kingdom of Heaven on earth is renewed and transposed into the near future 
by the promise of an approaching collapse of capitalism. According to 
Mannheim Marxist thought neglected to apply its process of critical 
demystification, "this ontologically relativizing (seinsrelativierende) 
 method"^ - a process it directed against all other ways of thought as ideologies 
- to itself and "its own hypostatization and absolutism". The communist 
utopia in fact is empowered to an unchecked material violence by its own 
ideas of a realm of freedom and equality. Ideas themselves are endowed in 
Marxist thought with such an unquestionable reality status, with such 
unlimited power to control social reality as if according to some law, that one 
is not by chance reminded of the dominant status in earlier periods of the 
tenets of religious belief and of their predictions for the future. ,Karl Lowith 
demonstrated and substantiated precisely this connection convincingly: The 
grand modem philosophical sketches of history, and particularly the Marxist 
one, are "entirely dependent on theology, that is, on the theological 
exploitation of history as the history of the process of Redemption." They 
radically secularize theology's eschatological model, producing according to 
their "guiding principle" a connection between all individual historical 
events, and relate them to a "definitive  meaning."^ Using such 
interpretation of the process of history as "the attribution of meaning to the 
meaningless" - in Theodor Lessing's words'" - Communism, the Marxist 
creation of meaning, with its "surviving theological kernel"," easily belongs 
among the "veiled religions""' that blossomed in many forms in Europe 
especially since the tum of the century. In any examination of the self-images 
and roles of intellectuals it seems eminently important to me to keep in 
mind, in fact to adopt as ones main perspective the connection I have 
described between the 'emergence of the modem intellectual' and the radical 
crisis of meaning in Western civilization that caused the development of an 
immense 'hunger for meaning'. It is critical to note that the ideological 
worship that replaced the older religious one did not confine itself to that 
worship. Rather, in the new political mythologies a power existed that 
propelled it unavoidably toward practice: to stress it immediately, to 
totalitarian ideocracy, in which ideas actually became material, even bloody 
violence. The "ideas of 1914", the radically chauvinist, militantly violent 
visions of German intellectuals - writers, philosophers, historians, social 
scientists, literary scholars, etc. , most of them well-situated professors - 
already showed first what cruel contributions to the bloody reality of history 
intellectuals can make as rulers over the cultural-symbolic order, as self- 
professed 'consciences of the nation'."" fact, only the age of the totalitarian 
regime of 1917/18 through 194% and then through 1989/90 - an age that 
would not have been possible in the same way without the grand utopian 
systems and the totalizing metanarratives from the pens of intellectuals - 
made shockingly evident how far the "Treason of the Intellectuals","~ decried 
in 1927 by Julien Benda, can go. This obviously applies also to the 
relationships with right and left versions of totalitarianism. Particularly with 
a view to critical theory, which would not be possible without the impetus of 
Marxism, it remains a continual source of irritation that the socialist- 
communist framework, in its ideal intention even more universal and 
freeing than Christianity, was bound together so powerfully with totalitarian 
practice. Even more interesting and noteworthy are the intellectual positions 
of the representatives of critical theory over the decades, none of whom ever 
subscribed to a materially socialist system or submitted to a totalitarian 
practice. 
We know that a specific body of critical theory, or rather the Frankfurt School, 
did not really exist, with the exception of a few years in New York."" Despite 
this, and even before the exile of its exponents, there emerged a clearly- 
defined understanding of their own intellectuality and of the relationship of 
theory to political practice, an understanding that already in the Weirnar 
Republic was substantially different from the self-image of other relevant 
groups of intellectuals, particularly from those of the strict 'party' adherents. 
The experience of exile in America, the continual, alert observation from a 
distance of the German Nazi Regime, and finally the acknowledgment of the 
increasingly terroristic Stalinism in the Soviet Union, all sharpened during 
these years the consciousness of the social status of their own theories and the 
self-image of intellectuals. This resulted importantly in the elimination of 
earlier illusions and hopes. I am in no way able to develop this phenomenon 
here in the detail that it deserves; a crude sketch will have to suffice. 
The Frankfurt theorists - and here I concentrate primarily on Adomo, 
secondarily on Horkheimer - had all been schooled in the Marxist critique of 
political economy and ideology, and never disavowed this perspective or its 
analytical apparatus, even when they avoided for tactical or opportunistic 
reasons terms like "Marxism" and "C~mrnunism"."~ In addition they 
modified the Marxist approach distinctly by accepting psychoanalytic and 
sociopsychological theorems and methods, in order to live up to their own 
goal of broad social-scientific interdisciplinarity. Above all, however, they 
departed from several fundamental Marxist positions. Thus the industrial 
proletariat as the historical subject of the process of emancipation played no 
role for them. They also did not proceed from the expectation of stagnation 
in the development of production in capitalism (as Marx had in the third 
volume of "das Kapital"), but rather diagnosed its constantly expansive 
dynamic, which would cause a progressive destruction of man and nature.""' 
Finally, it is crucial to note their negative view of all industrial social systems 
that existed in the 1930s and 40s, a view that put the critical theorists as 
comprehending observers and especially as agents in an almost aporetic 
situation. It was clear that neither the Nazi-Regime, from which they had 
had to flee, nor Stalinism during the show trials from 1936 on, left reason to 
hope for any kind of revolutionary change. But the fact that the U.S., 
motherland of democracy with its highly-developed capitalism, had to be 
diagnosed as an almost completely delusionary coherence 
('Verblendungszusarnmenhang') ruled by instrumental reason, and given- 
over to the omnipresent principle of exchange - this fact also had decisive 
implications for the self-image of their own role as intellectuals. 
Horkheimer's and Adorno's 'Dialectic of Enlightenment' was essentially 
provoked by American experiences, above all of the culture industry, and was 
even written without full knowledge of the Nazi genocide of the Jews. Yet it 
is even without this knowledge also, in the words of Habermas, their "darkest 
book."xvu "Minima Moralia", the first of three parts of which had already been 
completed before Horkheimer's 50th Birthday on February 14,1945, focused 
on the contemplation of the minimal options that Adorno saw for the 
intellectual given the bleak diagnosis of the global situation presented by the 
"negativist philosophy of history""- in the "Dialectic of Enlightenment". 
The messianic perspective, which at least in Benjamin's schema had always 
fascinated Adorno even when he was harshly critical of it, had by now almost 
disappeared - almost as though Benjamin had taken it with him to his grave 
in his suicide on September 26, 1940. When the first Parisian edition of the 
"Zeitschrift fiir Sozialforschung" came out in the fall of 1933, one read in 
Horkheimer's introduction that the group of contributors at the Institute 
perceived "in theory a factor that would contribute to improving reality." It 
further stated: "Conceptual thought (' Das begreifende Denken') does not 
have the same meaning for all societal forces: for some it is harmful ballast; 
for the progressive forces of humanity it will, however, be indispensable.""'" 
Here there is, in fact, neither the expectation of revolution nor any reference 
to a historical subject that would lead such a revolution. And yet the belief in 
the capacity to improve the world - and in the sizable role of critical theory in 
that process - persists. How different the perspective in Adorno's "Minima 
Moralia," the "Reflections from Damaged Life," written ten, twelve, and 
fourteen years later. "Progressive forces", with which critical thought could 
ally itself, are nowhere in sight, neither during the war nor after it, and even 
less than ever before in the proletariat: "The negative element of thought is 
universally scorned in all classes.""" Adorno holds fast to this "negative 
element of thought", but he knows that the "intellectual, and even the 
philosophical intellectual, is cut off from material praxis", which, however, 
"not only [is] the prerequisite condition of his own existence", but which "also 
[forms] the basis of the world", "with the critique of which his work 
coincides.""' Repeatedly, almost obsessively, Adorno explicates the aporia of 
the intellectual, a problem that at that time - 1944-47 - seemed irresolvable 
('unaufhebbar') to him: the ability 'correctly' to think through the capitalist 
reality only when far away from it, without however being able to escape 
from it. For example: "Only he who stays relatively pure has sufficient hate, 
nerve, freedom and mobility to resist the world, but precisely through the 
illusion of purity - since he exists 'in the third person' - he allows the world to 
triumph not only outside but even in his innermost  thought^.""^^ There is 
no real escape from such an "entanglement"; "The only thing that one can 
justifiably do is to forgo ideological misuse of one's own existence, and in all 
else to behave modestly, inconspicuously and unpretentiously, behavior that 
for a long time has not been demanded by good upbringing, but that is 
required to compensate for the shameful fact that in hell there is still enough 
air to breathe.""s The final, 153rd section of "Minima Moralia" poses for the 
last time the stubbornly penetrating question of where the place of the 
intellectual can be when there is "no right way to live within the wrong."""" 
Surprisingly Adorno now takes up the Messianic perspective again, 
admittedly in the conditional voice, which turns out to be unreal: "The only 
philosophy for which we are legitimately responsible when faced with 
desperation ["wie sie im Angesicht der Verzweiflung einzig noch zu 
verantworten ist"], would be [!I the attempt to see all things the way they 
represent themselves from the standpoint of Redemption."""' It is at the 
same time "the easiest thing of all" to represent the world with all its "tears 
and crevasses" as a "completed negativity", precisely because this demands 
nothing more than an unadulterated description of the true condition of the 
world. This isf according to Adomo, also readable as the "mirror writing" of 
what should be: But at the same time it is "the absolutely impossible, because 
it presupposes a position that is, even if only minimally, removed from the 
sphere of existence"xxvi - and that is precisely outside the realm of the possible. 
In spite of this Adorno holds fast to the paradox of such impossible-possible 
thought, even to the perspective of Redemption, although, as he concedes, 
"the question of the reality or irreality of Redemption" is u n a n s ~ e r a b l e . ~ ~ ~  
We know that later authentic works of art will substitute in this gap left by 
Redemption, and we will return to this again. Here we must note that 
towards the end of 1949, when they return to Germany, to the newly-founded 
Federal Republic as the only members of the Institute along with Friedrich 
Pollock, Horkheimer and above all Adorno have a highly skeptical, if not 
bleak view of the world and, to put it bluntly, favor a theory without praxis. 
If it were otherwise Adomo would probably not have handed over his 
"Minima Moralia" to the German public in 1951 without any deletions. 
What the most educated, bright and politically sensitive German intellectuals 
offered the West German post-war public (the East German public was not 
asked for its input), was thus, in the form of the "Dialectic of Enlightenment" 
and of the "Minima Moralia", above all quite possibly unwieldy, alienated 
from praxis, and scrupulous; no wonder the effect of these books and their 
thoughts remained decidedly weak for so long. 
Turning to the question of the self-image and roles of German intellectuals 
after 1945, we must keep in mind that four or five important decades of the 
history of 'the' modem intellectual have already ended - with almost all 
thinkable discursive attributions and their (lack of) realization. There was the 
figure of the intellectual as spokesperson for universal values (justice, truth, 
reason), who, as a moralist, claimed that his mind was independent of the 
forces of power. Since then there have also been droves of 'intellectual 
traitors', to use Julien Benda's concept, who appeared in the name of a 
particular national, race or class identity and who joined up with a 
totalitarian regime as ideologues of a secularized doctrine of Redemption; 
who thus believed in or practiced opportunistically the compatibility of mind 
and power. Nazi Germany had provided enough examples. Martin 
Heidegger, Carl Schmitt and Gottfried Benn (for a good year), are only the 
most famous. But many left intellectuals - among them many literati, who 
acted as party communists (or "communists without the party manual", like 
Bertolt Brecht) - these also must be considered to be Benda's 'traitors' to the 
universal mission of intellectuals. 
It is characteristic of the situation after the war, particularly in the west- 
occupied zones, that after such bad experiences there existed no general 
interest in the question of what public function intellectuals should fulfill. 
World War and Nazi terror had caused not only immeasurable physical 
devastation, but also moral devastation. Only very few non-exiled members 
of the intelligentsia were able to conceive of the 'Nullpunkt', the 'ground 
zero' not just as a collapse but as a freeing from a regime of terror and thus as 
a chance for a far-ranging mental and political revolution. In this inability 
these intellectuals were representative of the general population. The first 
notable exceptions were the initiators of the journal "Der Ruf. Unabhhgige 
Blatter der jungen Generation", Alfred Andersch and Hans Werner Richter, 
who contemplated very seriously a radical sociopolitical reformation of 
Germany, and who found their orientation in the French resistance 
movement and in the existential philosophy of Sartre and Camus. 
Admittedly the Gruppe 47, which was primarily initiated by Richter and 
which still has the aura of progressiveness and material democracy, has been 
revealed in the meantime as political legend. Klaus Briegleb has done the 
most to demonstrate concretely how questionable the anti-fascist "young 
Germany" assembled there really was: it was again a gioup of men who 
played power games, excluded the new or different, and barely suffered from 
any self-doubt about their own wartime pasts. Thus Alfred Andersch could 
write in 1946: "The Young Generation stood for the wrong thing. But it 
stood."XxVU' Generally the proclamation of the 'Nullpunkti in the West- 
occupied zones meant the refusal to deal with the Nazi past (and with one's 
own acts during it), a "helpless anti-fascism" that had already been 
characteristic of many intellectuals in the years before and around 1933. Just 
as they then had refused to engage in decisive, practical political experience, 
they now refused again. The model of society with which they were newly 
confronted was that of westem-liberal democracy (a privilege long 
underestimated also by the Left), a society bound up with capitalist market 
economy and with the "American Way of Life". All of this stood, sublime 
and distant, in dominant opposition to the "obscuring, removed literature" of 
the older Bergenpen, Carossa, R. A. Schroder and of the younger Hermann 
Kasack or Erhart Kastner, a literature that "made a production of culture" in 
order to "upstage the still present reality of fascism."""'" We should also not 
underestimate the role that Ernst Jiinger played as an exemplary figure, a role 
that at first was covert, then overt after the repeal of the publication ban in 
1949. Jiinger's astheticizing, elitist texts from the time of the Third Reich, 
above all "Auf den Mannorklippen" and "Strahlungen", were very well 
received by those who in a similar way had withdrawn and stayed silent, or as 
Jiinger put it, practiced 'desinvolture' and 'souplesse' ('relaxed and adapted 
themselves'). 
Of course the important intellectuals and writers who had gone into exile 
could have played a key role in the "sanitizing work that awaited Germany 
after the end of fascism," namely, in Enzensberger's words, in the "ideological 
garbage removal."""" But most of them did not, as we know, return. That was 
also true of the former members of the Frankfurt Institute and other 
important social scientists. All of them except Horkheimer, Adorno, and 
Pollock stayed in the U.S. or in Great Britain. Benjamin had committed 
suicide in 1940. In 1947 Karl Mannheim died in London, and in 1966 
Siegfried Kracauer died in New York. At any rate, aside from the three from 
Frankfurt, four other important social philosophers returned around 1949-50 
to the German-speaking world: E m t  Bloch to Leipzig, Giinter Anders to 
Vienna, Helmuth Plessner to Gottingen and Karl Lowith to Heidelberg. Of 
the important writers Anna Sehgers, Bertolt Brecht and Arnold Zweig 
returned to the Eastern sector on political grounds, while no-one but Alfred 
Doblin settled in the Western sectors (or the young Federal Republic); even 
he stayed isolated. All other great exiled figures, particularly Thomas Mann, 
could or would no longer consider repatriating to Germany. 
The new political-intellectual orientation thus occurred in a vacuum in 
those decisive first four or five years after the end of the Nazi regime - with 
the consequence that for a long time after the Nazi period people reverted to 
supposedly unblemished cultural traditions. Adorno also demonstrated this 
in his important essay of 1950, "Resurrection of culture in Germany?" 
Instead of the expected "dullness, lack of education and cynical distrust of 
everything intellectual", he found, especially at the university, a strong 
"relationship to intellectual things", even an "intellectual passion.""""' 
Adorno immediately recognized the snag inherent in this cultural 
. enthusiasm: "Cultural involvement in Postwar Germany carries with it an 
element of the dangerous and ambiguous comfort of provincial security. [...I 
Today education fulfills the not insignificant function of obliterating and 
repressing past horror and one's own responsibility for it. As an isolated area 
of existence utterly devoid of a precise relationship to social reality, culture is 
useful for obscuring the regression into barbarism.""""" Unlike in the 
situation after 1918, now in 1950 Adorno misses a "refusal to consent" and - 
we should be amazed at this! - the "power of utopia"."""" And at the end he 
outlines an almost hopeful perspective that definitely again credits critical 
theory and art with much more than even three years earlier in "Minima 
Moralia": "To see through the machinery, to know that the appearance of the 
inhuman conceals human circumstances, and to gain power over these 
circumstakes - all of these are steps in a process of Redempti~n."""~~~ 
During the fifties the critical theory that had been renewed at the 
University of Frankfurt became "the critical decoration for a restorative 
societyn,"x"" but its intellectual influence remained limited. The return of 
Adorno was, as Habermas and others repeatedly maintained, a particular 
stroke of luck for intellectually bankrupt Postwar Germany, but it still took 
considerable time for the fruits of Horkheimer's and Adorno's pedagogical 
and journalistic labors to be harvested. Their most important work, "The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment", stayed in the shadows for over twenty years, 
until the mid-sixties, before it found broad circulation, first through word of 
mouth and then through pirate editions at universities. The consciousness- 
raising and incremental formation of nonconformist writers in the Federal 
Republic, together with the campaigns against rearmament and atomic 
weaponry, still occurred largely without the constitutive influence of the 
Frankfurt School. Nevertheless there were basic points of contact, but they 
were due to the German circumstances and not to any direct influence of 
critical theory. The West-German writers from Giinter Eich to Heinrich Boll, 
from Wolfgang Koeppen to Alfred Andersch, were deeply disappointed by the 
path things had taken in Germany. The "era of our democratic illusions"""" 
(Andersch's words about the first Postwar years) was superseded by the 
cementing of the separation of states, the integration of both states in the 
military blocs of the superpowers, and the growth of a complacently 
conservative, even politically reactionary cultural milieu, which ignored as 
much as possible the involvement of many Germans in the Nazi crimes. In 
this milieu the critical authors felt like loners and outsiders, for whom there 
remained only refusal - nonconformism - provided that they did not resign 
themselves to the situation. Thus they weren't too far from Adorno's 
precarious relationship between theory and praxis. 
We should add a second point here. During the fifties and early sixties a 
series of highly talented young German-speaking authors - from Alfred 
Andersch and Paul Celan to Ingeborg Bachmann and Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger - rediscovered a radical aesthetic Modernism that had been 
outlawed for twelve years under Nazism, and that was even largely 
unknown in the Postwar period. This also meant, however, a rediscovery of 
Max Weber's notion of the realm of art as an autonomous sphere of values, 
which by definition is nonconformist, and which can further be identified as 
a denial of and protest against the bad global condition, but possibly also as a 
utopian anticipation of Redemption from it. This is the common spirit of the 
essay Andersch dedicated to Adorno, "Die Blindheit des Kunstwerks" (1956), 
of Bachmann's poetry readings in Frankfurt (1959-60), of Celan's Biichner 
Prize speech "Der Meridian" (1960) and of Enzensberger's essay "Poesie und 
Politik" (1962). Most of these and similar poetological texts of these years 
were inspired by trains of thought in Adorno's speeches and essays (above all 
by the "Noten zur Literatur" that had been appearing since 1958). These 
speeches and essays by Adorno attributed a special status to the work of art: it 
was the only human creation to be free of the rule of the principle of 
exchange and of the delusional coherence caused by it, and the only one to be 
able to resist, by way of its aesthetic form, any and all appropriations by that 
coherence. Adomo had actually written in 1949 that to write a poem after 
Auschwitz was barbaric- but since then it was precisely this fragile work of 
art, whether poem or not, that had become the only thing Adorno thought 
able to respond appropriately to the suffering of the victims, and to make 
Redemption appear possible - all on account of the work of art's form. Here 
and in many other places Adomo thus departs from all concepts of engaged, 
even politically partial and strategic literature. Agitprop literature, politically- 
commissioned art, praise of those in power ... - he couldn't bear any of these, 
and even the great Brecht found no favor in his eyes. 
The Enzensberger of the years up to and including 1967-68 most clearly 
took up Adorno's conception of the work of art as the guardian of unrealized, 
truly human conditions, and he decisively opposed the conflation of art with 
power. "Its (the poem's) political task is to refuse all political tasks and to 
speak for all in places where no-one is talked about, to talk about a tree, a 
stone, or about what doesn't exist. (...) Poetry hands down the future. (...) It 
is anticipation, even if it is in the form of doubt, rejection or denial.""""- 
Doubtless Adorno could also have written these sentences. 
This conception of the tasks of the intellectual in general and of those of 
the artist in particular had, however, no permanence, and Enzensberger is the 
most striking example of this fact. The second half of the sixties in the 
Federal Republic was, as in many other Western countries, a time of radical 
change, protest and revolt. The phase of the '68 student movement is a good 
example of the fact that what an intellectual is or should be is not definitively 
determined, but rather is formulated as an attitude of expectation and as a 
discourse of claims in specific historico-political situations of crisis. A 
conversation between Alfred Andersch and Hans Magnus Enzensberger in 
1979 about the role of writer-intellectuals in the '68 phase demonstrated this 
very clearly. Andersch insists, and I agree, that the nonconformist writers 
would have disturbed "the jusfe milieu of the German restoration" before 
the years of the protests, and would have played "an influential political 
role". They were apparently correspondingly accused, as for example in 
Ludwig Erhard's "Pinscher" speech of [196?].""- Suddenly, in 1968, that was 
not enough. Together with the radical students one group of authors (and 
Enzensberger was among them) accused .the other authors of not really acting 
politically, but rather 'only in a literary fashion'. Andersch insists, on the 
other hand, that it was precisely several writers who, inspired by critical 
theorists, maintained important knowledge and passed it on to the students, 
who themselves possessed 'not even a minimum of the theoretical tools' 
from which they would have benefited. "They had no weapons", Andersch 
continues, because they had grown up under Fascism."' Andersch therefore 
also in retrospect insisted on limiting the function of intellectuals to the 
communication of knowledge, consciousness-raising and remembering, and, 
for artists, effort in terms of authentic form. But he excuses him from 
operative or agitprop work in the political battle, action that Enzensberger and 
many others had vehemently urged in "Kursbuch 15" and elsewhere. 
This explains the essence of the disagreement between the revolutionary 
students and Theodor W. Adorno. They wanted concepts and recipes from 
the country's leading intellectuals, such as Adomo, as to how the restorative 
system could be toppled. And they wanted active help in pushing through 
their positions; for example, they wanted an expert report from Adorno that 
would confirm the thesis of the lawyer Horst Mahler that the leaflets of the 
First Commune, which referred to a department store fire with 300 deaths, 
did not constitute a call to arson, but were instead merely satirical. Adomo 
delivered neither the desired recipes (even the increasingly favored Herbert 
Marcuse did not) nor the report, and it is well-known that this put a 
definitive end to any hope of communication between the protesting 
students and Adorno. Alfred Andersch's generalized commentary also 
applies to the precarious relationship between Adorno and the protesters: 
"The student movement overestimated rather than underestimated the 
intellectuals. It expected something from them that they could not deliver, 
and thereafter the iconoclastic and anti-intellectual trends within this 
movement grew out of the disappointment that these expectations were not 
f~lfilled."~' 
Since 1968, and under the pressure of relationships and events (from the 
Vietnam War, the State of Emergency laws and the edict against radicals to 
the "German Autumn of 1977 to the anti-atomic weapon movement, other 
ecological initiatives and the fight over the stationing of medium-range 
missiles), the search for and location of the West-German writer-intellectuals' 
position has resolutely pushed on and diversified. Some of them joined up  
with leftist parties and sectarian leftist groups, which entailed more or less 
unconditional identification with the Soviet Union on the one hand or with 
Maoist China on the other - both shocking cases of continued delusion about 
the nature of the era, and of "treason of intellectuals", when one considers 
how much was known, and for how long, about the crimes of these 
totalitarian systems. We can see from this fact alone how far from the 
insights of critical theory and its standards these 'party' intellectuals had 
actually regressed. Others - most importantly Heinrich Boll - consciously held 
on to the status of the unconditionally independent loner, without, however, 
wanting to function as 'the conscience of the nation.' It was Boll who 
recognized the necessity of first of all using the guaranteed opportunities of a 
parliamentary democracy, and who in 1977 turned against "the developing 
utopia of the free-floating intellectual" as "politically  irresponsible.""^ A 
development initiated in 1968 was in fact completed by the mid-eighties, as a 
consequence of which "the monopoly on protest had been taken away from 
the liberals and left intellectuals."~ And Enzensberger was able to state even 
contentedly in 1987: 'We have lost Boll, but we have Amnesty International 
and Greenpeace to replace 
The controversies around German reunification and particularly the 
heated [WestIGerman-[EastIGerman literary debates surrounding Christa 
Wolf and others in the years since 1989 have demonstrated, often to a 
ludicrous degree, that the old claim of intellectuals to the defense of universal 
values, and to the power to define within the symbolic order, has in no way 
expired. Even when far-reaching errors should have been corrected people 
too often clung with unwavering self-assurance to system-bound, utopian 
and finally undemocratic leftist concepts. And there are writers/intellectuals 
who are still irrepressibly playing the role of conscience of the nation or of 
self-appointed spokesperson for particular groups of disadvantaged and 
injured - a self-attribution that, in my opinion, Adorno and other critical 
theorists would never have made. Possibly the approximately hundred year- 
old age of the universal, pioneering intellectual (if he actually ever existed), 
has ended, as we live today in a period of dynamic, democratic, grass-roots 
civic movements on the one hand and necessarily ever more differentiated 
expert knowledge on the other. Evidently we still need a constant 
development of interdisciplinarily conceptualized and critical social theory 
and research, such as that which the Frankfurt School called for and practiced, 
one which aims at the improvement of the conditions of life. 
Here we can only comment in passing on the self-images and concepts of 
East-German or GDR writer-intellectuals, and on possible influences of 
critical theory; this will necessarily result in abbreviation. To put it 
apodictically: The typical ideal of the modem intellectual as spokesperson for 
universal values, as the rigorous champion of a truth and morality not 
bound-up in ideology, who challenges power and its persecution with his 
intellect - this ideal hardly ever existed in the GDR. Whenever members of 
the intelligentsia, whether writers or not, went in this direction and 'expressed 
it publicly, it usually led to their arrest and/or deportation (as for example in 
the case of Rudolf Bahro, Jiirgen Fuchs and many members of the citizens' 
movement.) What was typical for the forty-year duration of the GDR was the 
image of the intellectual as priest of the worldly religion of Socialism, as the 
spokesperson of a (hypostatized) "working class" identity, and as the 
conscience of an anti-fascist morality; For a long time this intellectual did not 
at all experience the label of "Dichter im Dien~t"~" as derogatory. On the 
contrary Westerners, including the intellectuals who insisted on their 
independence, were pitied as "people without a sense of  belonging.""'^ For 
too long the members of the literary intelligentsia in the GDR lived in a 
familial, authoritarian relationship based on loyalty to their state, which 
essentially rested on the anti-fascist foundational myth of the GDR. After 
World War I1 the project of socialism was accepted by young people, 
including members of the intelligentsia, primarily because it promised to be 
the absolute opposite of "Fascism", and would thus provide a beginning out 
of nothingness, a Christmas-like rebirth. National Socialism - which the 
communists had a predilection for calling "Fascism" - was per se Evil, the 
absolute enemy of humanity. Consequently "Anti-fascism", and along with it 
Socialism, was promoted automatically to the status of the Good, the friend of 
humanity per se, which furthermore - after Nazism had just collapsed - 
opened up yet another eschatological ('heilsgeschichtliche') prospect for earth. 
It is historically plausible that people then would be attached to such dualistic, 
principle-bound conception and thought. Under the Nazi regime only two 
basic reactions were really possible: assimilation and subordination or refusal 
and resistance. The trap opened up by the newly-empowered founding 
fathers of the GDR consisted in the fact that they constantly decreed this 
dualism to be inescapable. Whoever was not "anti-fascist" and for the 
building of Socialism, was immediately labeled as a supporter of the 
discredited opposite, "Fascism" (later expressed more mildly as a "negative, 
hostile attitude.") "It was thus impossible to imagine political traditions 
other than the opposition of Fascism and its supposed opp~si te . ' "~  The offer 
made to all former on-lookers, and even to perpetrators of 'minor deeds' in 
the Third Reich - now to be allowed into the broad anti-fascist alliance, and 
thus to count oneself among the "victors of history" - was at once enticing 
and comforting, provided that one suffered from a bad conscience. At the 
same time it proved to be a "trap of 10yalty""~- that was hard to escape, since 
whoever wanted to describe the GDR-regime without gloss (for example, as 
writers), as it really was, and whoever wanted to behave according to his 
critical perceptions, automatically departed from the basic anti-fascist 
consensus, according to which being anti-fascist and a good GDR-citizen were 
identical. 
In that the thus re-educated GDR 'intellectuals' - I am not talking here 
about the few older authors who returned from exile - supported another 
'totalizing' belief and world view, for a long time they accepted voluntarily 
the system-immanent task given to literature: that of functioning to educate 
the people, of being socially activist, and of raising the country's inhabitants 
to "Socialist personhood". Until the sixties only very few therefore claimed 
art and literature as an autonomous sphere of values. Volker Braun's 
response to the already-mentioned essay "Poesie und Politik by 
Enzensberger, entitled "Politik und Poesie" (1971), is an example of t h i ~ . " ~  
Most writers still lived in a state of "confessional euphoria after declaring 
their belief in Socialism",' and did not question the construct of Socialism. 
They instead repeatedly and voluntarily made literary and essayistic 
contributions to the ruling optimistic anthropology, for which the ability to 
create the "new person" and hence a better world was unquestionable. Under 
such premises critical theory - with its radically skeptical analysis of modem 
Western civilization, with its refusal of leftist totalitarianism, and with its 
scrupulous vision of the social role of intellectuals, artists and art itself - could 
only appear foreign and hostile to GDR writers. To my mind there was 
clearly no such encounter. With the exception of Benjamin the GDR 
published, until its collapse, no texts by representatives of critical theory. 
Only from about 1965 on is there any gradual crisis of meaning among the 
intelligentsia. It was concerned with the existing Socialist system in the GDR, 
which was being increasingly perceived as authoritarian, even inhospitable. 
It also concerned, however, the growing industrialization and destruction of 
resources, with their detrimental impacts on man and nature. People started 
to recognize that these events, bi-products of instrumentalist reason, 
characterized not only the hated system of capitalism, but also all existing 
socialist states. From this realization there developed, after an almost 
uncritical cult of technology, a real phobia of technology and a hostility to 
modernity, precisely among those (such as Giinther Kunert, Christa Wolf, 
Franz Fiihmann and Volker Braun) who had even until the early sixties been 
the most passionate champions of the effort to push through an industrial 
civilization. A statement made by Giinther Kunert in 1966 is exemplary of 
the 'new consciousness', of which the SED had to disapprove: "Auschwitz 
and Hiroshima stand at the beginning of the technical age; I am only naming 
them here in the same breath because of their relationship to the socially 
-:s organized use of technology. I believe that it can only be out of great naivete 
that one would equate technology with societal and humanitarian progress."" 
It has not been clarified yet in any detailed way if such a statement is based 
on knowledge of Horkheimer's and Adomo's "Dialectic of Enlightenment", 
nor to what extent that work informs the belletristic literature from the GDR, 
a literature critical of civilization and rationality that has since proliferated on 
a large scale. We can assume or at least suppose that authors such as Christa 
Wolf ("Kein Ort. Nirgends", "Kassandra", and other works), Heiner Miiller 
("Medea-Stiick, "Gundling-Collage", "Hamletmaschine", and other works), 
and Giinther Kunert (poetry and short prose), possibly also Volker Braun and 
Christoph Hein, at least read that bleak book and other works by Adorno and 
Marcuse during the seventies and eighties. But I suppose that it is more 
important to note a kind of osmotic exchange beyond the iron curtain, a 
correspondence of alarmed realization that resulted from the real dictates and 
catastrophic consequences of instrumental reason in both East and West. 
Retrospectively we should appreciate that much more Horkheimer and 
Adorno's theoretical, analytical, and even prognostic achievement in 1944: 
At that time we know that their substantive focus was not yet at all concerned 
with the concrete destruction of environment and res~urces .~  
The discourse that had become almost dominant in late GDR literature - a 
discourse critical of civilization and that followed directly or indirectly in the 
wake of the "Dialectic of Enlightenment", contributed in a beneficial way to 
the general disillusionment of a literary intelligentsia that once believed so 
strongly in progress and enlightenment. Admittedly that was not enough to 
save this intelligentsia - an authoritarian state's substitute for its public that 
was still privileged as critical because it was taken seriously - from falling hard 
after the collapse of the GDR. The literary intelligentsia was now no longer 
the conscience of the working class, but actually the spokespeople and 
guardians of a "true" and "personified, humane" Socialism (which did not 
preclude some authors' attraction to dictatorship through education); but this 
hypertrophied situation was untenable. The first months of the Wende in 
October/November of 1989 were only the climax of the illusions this 
intelligentsia maintained concerning the ability to reconcile intellect and 
power - these months did not represent their real reconciliation. That fact 
caused widespread offense and melancholy that in many cases was not 
conquered, but rather turned into the permanent condition of (N)O~talgie.~ 
Here also an orientation along the lines of the critical theorists' scrupulous 
self-image of intellectuals could not hurt. 
A balance-sheet of the concepts and roles of intellectuals from the last fifty 
years of German history, of which four decades have been lived as two states 
bound up with systems hostile to one another, reveals stark contrasts and an 
increasing lack of coherence, which should not be artificially reduced to a 
common denominator. There was, in fact, first a general, fundamental anti- 
fascist consensus in the four occupation zones after 1945. Clearly, in the East 
this consensus was defined from the beginning as a socialist one, necessary in 
its consistency, and immediately instrumentalized. The deployment of this 
consensus, conceived of from the beginning, became a practical one at least 
from 1949/50 on, most importantly for the writers [sic]. Under different 
political conditions the literary intelligentsia in the Westem-occupied zones 
learned different lessons from the trauma of the Nazi crimes and from the 
totalitarian 'treason' of a segment of the intellectual population. Many of 
them dreamed the dream of a radical democratic Socialism, one that was 
however immediately shattered by reality. An attitude of nonconformism, 
most commonly of an isolated kind, remained, which only came out in 
isolated cases and which expressed itself as protest made public, when, for 
example, it concerned rearmament, acquisition of atomic weaponry, and later 
the Springer Press and the State of Emergency Laws. After almost two decades 
of right-wing conservative governmental majority and the subsequent Great 
Coalition, and especially under the pressure of a young generation (of those 
later called '68ers), the former self-conception of many, even of older West- 
German intellectuals became so questionable that they energetically cast off 
the nonconformist, reason-bound attitude and engaged themselves directly 
and politically within parliamentary democracy. They also later became 
involved politically outside it (as so-called APOs), and even with concepts of 
revolutionary coups (whose 'subject' in their own country was admittedly 
sought for in vain.) A small group decided on an "armed battle" against the 
"system", i.e. on terrorism. During the seventies and eighties this political 
activism was largely spent, and transformed itself into a productive 
engagement in the new social (civic) movements, and in a moderate leftist- 
liberal position, which in many respects continued the old nonconformism. 
That did not stop many people from nourishing utopian hopes for the "true 
Socialism", without considering the feasibility of its practical realization, and 
above all often without separating this clearly from the totalitarian "actual 
Socialism". The majority of West-German intellectuals were thus badly if at 
all prepared for the collapse of the GDR and the reunification that was 
unexpectedly getting under way.. There was a corresponding illusionary 
status on the part of the East-German literary intelligentsia, but with 
decisively more crucial consequences. The delusion was two-fold and, quite 
literally, groundless: firstly, because as reformed socialists they had never 
given up their basic loyalty to the socialist camp (which now lost its site), and 
secondly, because they abruptly lost their hypertrophied role as critical ersatz - 
public to the constitutional public of ,a liberal democracy. This democracy's 
need for the great intellectual as socialist conscience of the nation was now 
minimal. 
What can the theory and praxis of the intellectual in modem societies, 
such as that presented by critical theory and especially by Adomo, offer in 
response to all this? .We know that for many Leftists it did not go far enough. 
Even Lukacs vehemently rebuked the Frankfurt School, saying that they had 
installed themselves comfortably in the "Abyss Hotel", and Brecht shared this 
view in his many attacks against the "Tuis". Such reproaches multiplied after 
1968. Wolfgang Fritz Haug, for example, thus criticized them for "resignative 
utopia" and "disillusionment with realityw.& And even in 1968 Jost Hermand 
reproached Adomo for "a mentality of l'art pour l'art" (art for art's sake) and 
for "elitist, pessimistic cultural criticism", a "stoic pessimism that expresses its 
now meaningless resistance only in an impotent gesture of refusal."" 1 have 
already indicated that critical theory appeared to even incrementally skeptical 
GDR writers to be nothing more than late-bourgeois defeatism. 
I would like to contradict such harsh dressings-down distinctly. It cannot 
be laid at the authors' doors that a seminal work like the "Dialectic of 
Enlightenment" lay around for twenty years as a "message in a bottle"." With 
complete justification Adomo noted even in 1962 "the absence of a proactive 
intellectual movement today"."' If such a movement grew at all it is not least 
because of Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Habermas. At any rate Adorno 
did, as Habennas affirmed, "ma[k]e a generation of younger academics, [...I 
one or two generations of students, and an public that was ready to learn, that 
read his essays and heard his radio presentations, sensitive to the distortions 
and the marginalizing potential of their own traditions, and to that which 
had become estranged and suppressed in  them."'^ These effects are not least 
to be found in the arts - from Celan, Bachmann and Enzensberger to 
Alexander Klug's literary and filmic work and to the composition theory and 
practice of many younger composers; these effects are even to be found in 
Botho Strauf3' texts, at least until the early eighties. I have already mentioned 
the indirectly massive effects of the theory of instrumental reason on the 
more recent civilization-critical literature from the GDR (and of course on 
that of the Federal Republic). Admittedly, instructions for action were not to 
be obtained from the Frankfurt School critics. "Our task in life is theoretical 
work", Horkheimer had written in a letter at the end of 1941, and that is as far 
as it went.lVs Even Herbert Marcuse ended his 1964 (German, 1967) study, 
"Der eindimensionale Mensch" - a study that led to so much political 
activism (and actionism) - with these skeptical sentences: "Socially critical 
theory has no concepts that could bridge the gap between the present and its 
future; in that it promises nothing and demonstrates no success, it stays 
negative. In so doing it wants to keep the allegiance of those who, without 
hope, have given and continue to give their lives to the Great Resistan~e."~~ 
I share Albrecht Wellmer's (and others') reservations about the 
"metatheoretical premises of Adorno, through which real history is a priori 
fixed as a negativity", and about Adomo's "constitutive connection between 
negativity and Me~sianism".~' I also see an intellectual elitism at work that I 
now consider more dubious than ever, but the work should not be confused 
with the belief in the leading political role of an intellectual elite. I profit 
endlessly and continually, however, from the interdisciplinary, critical- 
theoretical beginning of the Frankfurt School theorists, and I consider their 
scrupulous, constantly self-reflexive attitude as intellectuals - one that is also 
allergic to appropriation - to be at least a still important option, if we want 
today to try to understand ourselves and each other as - naturally - 
intellectuals. 
(Translation: Margaret Bloom$eld) 
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